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Abstract. The fundamentals of the Maximum Entropy principle as a rule for assigning and 
updating probabilities are revisited. The Shannon-Jaynes relative entropy is vindicated as the 
optimal criterion for use with an updating rule. A constructive rule is justified which assigns the 
probabilities least sensitive to coarse-graining. The implications of these developments for 
interpreting physics laws as rules of inference upon incomplete information are briefly 
discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Motivation 
Ever since E. Jaynes formulated the Maximum Entropy (MaxEnt) principle and used it 
to derive Statistical Thermodynamics [1], questions of the following type have 
developed significance and have been lingering around: To what extend other physics 
laws can be understood as rules of inference? How cheap can mechanics' first 
principles be [3]? How much of physics is just computation [2]? Are predictions of 
physics theories just those containing the least amount of information compatible with 
the descriptive framework used [4]? Is Quantum Mechanics the only consistent way to 
manipulate probability amplitudes [5]? And, last but not least, can all of physics be 
derived from information-theoretic principles [6]? In order to be able to even start 
thinking of answering these and similar questions, one needs a firm conceptual ground 
allowing unambiguous understanding of the MaxEnt principle itself. Unfortunately, 
we appear to still lack such an understanding [7]. Therefore, in the present work we set 
out to revise the fundamentals of the Maximum Entropy paradigm. 
The Paradigm and Its Shortcomings 
Constructive rule (MaxEnt) 
In its original scope [1] the MaxEnt principle is a constructive one - a device for 
assigning probabilities based on incomplete information. Probability assignments are 
thought to be adequate representation of one's state of knowledge about the system of 
interest, and the incomplete information is usually obtained by performing 
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measurements on that system. The ultimate goal is to be able to predict the results of 
all possible measurements on the system from the outcomes of a finite, preferably 
small, number of measurements. This of course is not a well-posed problem in the 
usual sense, so the answer is sought in the form of probability distribution compatible 
with the measurements but otherwise as undedicated as possible. In order to put 
operational meaning into the vague notion of ''as undedicated as possible'' it is 
necessary to agree on a measure of information content (or the lack thereof) in a 
probability distribution. Once such a measure is selected, ''most undedicated'' 
translates into the ''one with the least information content'' compatible to the available 
information. For such a measure of the lack of information Jaynes chose to use the 
Shannon's entropy of a probability distribution },,1,{ Nipi L= , 
namely ∑ =−= Ni ii pppS 1 ln][ , therefore we refer to this form, as well as to its 
generalizations in what follows, as the Shannon-Jaynes (relative) entropy. This choice 
is by no means unambiguous. Indeed, its usual justification is based on requiring the 
measure to obey a set of axioms and proving an existence and uniqueness theorem 
[8,9]. Such an axiomatic approach can be challenged on two counts - the plausibility 
of one or more of its axioms and the completeness of the proof that the proposed 
solution is unique. Unfortunately, the Shannon-Jaynes entropy characterization is 
susceptible to both these challenges. First, neither Shannon nor Khinchin made a very 
good point demonstrating that their distributivity axiom represents an absolutely 
necessary property of the measure, as discussed e.g. by Renyi [10]. Second, in proving 
the uniqueness of the measure Shannon apparently overlooks the circumstance that his 
argument holds for an arbitrary non-negative base of the logarithm function, including 
the possibility that different bins of the probability domain have different bases which 
may even depend on the bin’s probability2. Thus a more general expression of the 
form 
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with iii pm
αln1−= playing the role of apriori weights, results from the axioms. 
Introducing }{ im  in place of the logarithm bases }{ iα merely facilitates the 
interpretation of these parameters as bin weights. That such weights are necessary 
becomes particularly obvious when one tries to pass to the limit of a continuous 
domain, and their arbitrariness forces a change on the interpretation of the MaxEnt 
prescription from a rule for assigning probabilities to a rule for updating probabilities.   
Updating rule (M.E.)  
Being interested mainly in the physics applications of the MaxEnt principle, in 
what follows we will consider probability distributions with continuous domains. In 
contrast to Shannon’s original expression, the passage to continuum in the above 
formula is straightforward and results in a change-of-variable invariant measure 
)(
)(ln)(][
xm
xpxpdxpS ∫−=  
                                                 
2 Khinchin, on the other hand, explicitly requires that the entropy is maximal for uniform probabilities, which effectively invokes 
the notorious  Principle of Insufficient Reason and is open to all well-known objections to it [Ufink’95]. 
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where dxxp )(  is the probability of ),[ dxxxx +∈  and 0)( >xm . This is but the 
negative of the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance between the probability distributions 
)(xp  and )(xm . In the new interpretation of the MaxEnt principle as an updating rule, 
which, following [11] I’ll call “M.E.”, one updates )(xm  to )(xp  by maximizing ][ pS  
(or, equivalently, minimizing the KL distance between m and p) subject to constraints 
representing new information. In an attempt to circumvent the shortcomings of the 
Shannon’s argument in the continuous case, Shore and Johnson [12] set out to derive 
an updating rule by imposing uniqueness and consistency requirements not on the 
form of the measure but directly on the outcome of the procedure. Although their 
system of axioms includes a requirement equivalent to simple additivity of the 
measure for independent subsystems, they surprisingly derived the Shannon-Jaynes 
form as the unique measure suitable for using in an updating rule. The surprise comes 
from the fact that, 20 years after Renyi published his paper, it should have been fairly 
well-known that simple additivity alone was too weak a condition to single out the 
Shannon-Jaynes relative entropy. Closer examination of Shore and Johnson’s proof 
identifies a statement at the very end of their second Appendix where they argue that 
two functions, F and H, are equivalent inasmuch as the one is a monotonic function of 
the other, so one can extremize either one, and they restrict their further considerations 
to F. What they apparently fail to recognize is that imposing the additivity requirement 
on F is not the same as imposing it on H and this is exactly what prevents them from 
obtaining the Renyi’s family of relative entropies as further solution of their problem 
along with the Shannon-Jaynes relative entropy. 
Vàn’s derivation 
Recently P.Vàn proposed a derivation of a constructive rule for the continuous case 
[13] where he allowed the information measure to depend on the first derivative of the 
probability density. This kind of dependence is a commonplace in variational calculus, 
but, apparently due to the discrete domain roots of the problem, has not been 
considered before in the MaxEnt context. Allowing the derivative to appear in the 
functional is also the most straightforward way to impose differentiability condition on 
the probability distribution function - a natural one in view of its physics applications. 
Regrettably, Vàn’s derivation falls into the same trap as Shore and Johnson’s in that 
being based on a simple additivity axiom it derives a measure in the form of a linear 
combination of the simple Shannon-Jaynes entropy and the Fisher information in p 
associated with x. Although deficient, Van’s derivation is the first to clearly indicate 
that Fisher information may play an important role in a rigorous MaxEnt approach. 
There are further conceptual problems with the MaxEnt approach related to the way 
new information, obtained from measurements or otherwise, is introduced into the 
rule. They were first pointed at by Karbelkar [14], addressed by Ufink [7] and are 
discussed at length by Giffin and Caticha in these Proceedings. We will briefly 
mention some of those in the following sections.  
To summarize, there are number of problems with the current MaxEnt paradigm 
which seem to justify a fresh, from scratch, approach to the derivation of updating and 
constructive rules. Such an approach is proposed in the subsequent two sections.  
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CHARACTERIZATION OF THE UPDATING RULE 
The rationale behind the M.E. updating rule is a very simple and sound one: Given 
that our state of  knowledge regarding a system is encoded into a probability density 
)(xm  (designated “a prior”)  and new information is obtained in the form of an 
average value of  system’s observable, update )(xm  to )(xp (called “posterior”) such 
that the information distance between )(xm  and )(xp  is minimal, subject to the 
average value constraint. If this can be done in more than one equivalent ways the 
result should be the same. In other words, when updating probability distributions, one 
must be conservative and consistent. Clearly, all we need to implement the above 
desiderata is a proper definition of information distance. As discussed in the 
Introduction, when attempting to define information content in the usual way one 
necessarily ends up with information distance instead, so I’ll try to axiomatically 
characterize the information content  of a probability distribution in the hope to obtain 
an information distance measure. 
Basic Axioms 
1. (Weak) Locality: The information content of a probability distribution )(xp  
is an increasing function of a linear functional of )(xp  and )(xp∇ 3: 
)))(,(~(][ 2∫ ∇= ppfdxgpS  
      where ),(~ zxf  is a function to be determined; 
2. Expandability: The information content is invariant upon expansion of the 
domain with zero probability assignments: 
                         ))(,())(,(~ 22 ∫∫ ∇=∇ ppdxpfppfdx  with 0))(,( 02 ⎯⎯→⎯∇ →ppppf  
                 where the unspecified ),( zxf  replaces ),(~ zxf ; 
3. Additivity: For independent probability distributions the information 
content of the joint distribution is the sum of the information contents of the 
individual distributions: 
)]([)]([)]()([ 2121 ypSxpSypxpS +=  
      This condition should restrict the particular form of the functions )(xg  and  
      ),( zxf , hopefully unambiguously identifying them. 
 
Discussion of the Basic Axioms 
The justification of the first axiom is given by Shore and Johnson [12]. We simply 
replace the locality requirement by a weak locality one in that dependence on the first 
derivatives is allowed. Including first derivatives in the linear functional restricts the 
original notion of a small variation of the probability density )(xp from 
εδδ =|)(|max:)( xpxp
x
 to '|)(|max,|)(|max:)( εδεδδ =∇= xpxpxp
xx
 thus enforcing 
differentiability upon p(x). While the relevance of including differential criterion is not 
                                                 
3 Vàn has shown that if one allows higher derivatives the form of the possible terms depends on the dimensionality of the 
configuration space, which is clearly undesirable. Therefore we restrict ourselves to first derivatives only. 
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immediately obvious in the discrete case, in the continuous case it cannot be apriori 
dismissed without further analysis.  
The expandability axiom is a straightforward generalization of Khinchin’s third 
axiom to the continuous case. In addition to its original justification we’ll see later on 
that it is also a sufficient condition for the resulting updating rule to be consistent with 
the product rule of probability theory. 
The additivity property is equivalent to what Shore and Johnson call “subset 
independence”. While one can argue whether it is a necessary property of a general 
information content measure per se, it is absolutely essential for an updating rule 
based on such a measure in order to obtain consistent results when treating 
independent systems separately or combining them into a joint system. 
Consequences of the Basic Axioms 
In view of the form of the expression )))(,((][ 2∫ ∇= ppdxpfgpS there are two 
possibilities for achieving additivity of ][ pS : i) take )()()( ygxgyxg +=+  and 
require that ))(,( 2∫ ∇ppdxpf  is additive; or ii) take )()()( ygxgxyg +=  and require 
that ))(,( 2∫ ∇ppdxpf  factorizes. As it turns out, the first possibility is contained as a 
limiting case in the second one, so we only consider ii). In this case )(xg can be taken 
as )ln(xc where c is an arbitrary constant. It is convenient to rewrite the so far 
unknown function ))(,( 2ppf ∇ in the form ))(,( 2qqf ∇  where )(/)(ln)( xmxpxq =  
and )(xm  is an arbitrary positive function. The advantage of this form is that for a 
joint distribution of independent variables both arguments of f decompose to 
sums: )()(),( 21 yqxqyxq += , 22212 ))(())(()),(( yqxqyxq yx ∇+∇=∇ . Thus it 
becomes easy to see that the factorization requirement 
∫∫∫ ∇×∇=∇+∇+ ))(,()(,())()(,( 2122211121212121 qqfdypqqfdxpqqqqfpdxdyp yxyx
implies )exp(),(),(),(),( 22112121 zqzqfzqfzqfzzqqf βα +=⇒×=++ with α and β 
arbitrary constants, and, finally 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ ∇⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫ ])ln(exp[ln][ 2mpmppdxcpS β
α
 
This family, depending on three numerical parameters c, α, β and one arbitrary 
positive function m(x), appears to be the most general form consistent with the basic 
axioms4. The presence of m(x) however indicates that the original intention of deriving 
a unique measure of information content, and thus a constructive rule, in this way, is 
doomed. In view of the fact that, for non-negative α, β and c, S[p] is non-negative and 
vanishes only for p(x)=m(x), the alternative interpretation of S[p,m] as an information 
distance measure between the probability densities p(x) and m(x) suggests itself. 
Indeed, for particular choices of the parameters S[p,m] reduces to known forms of 
information distance: for β=0 and 1−−= αc  ( )αα mppdxmpS /ln],[ 1 ∫−−=  is the 
Renyi distance, while for αβ b= , α/ac =  and 0→α  
                                                 
4 A linear combination over the parameters with arbitrary weights will obviously also satisfy all requirements resulting from the 
axioms. 
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( ) ( ) 2)/ln(/ln],[ mppdxbmppdxampS ∇+= ∫∫  is a Van-type distance; if further b=0 
it reduces to the Shannon-Jaynes (or KL) distance, and if a=0 it turns into a kind of 
Fisher distance. 
To summarize, the axiomatic approach doesn’t seem capable of characterizing an 
information content measure but provides a characterization, albeit ambiguous one, of 
general purpose information distance measure. With such a characterization at hand, 
one can proceed to obtain an updating rule imposing goal-specific additional 
consistency requirements.  
Updating Rule: Narrowing Down the Choices 
The use of the information distance measure derived above in a M.E. updating rule 
implies solving the variational problem { } 0)()(],[ =+ ∫ xCxdxpmpS λδ  where the 
variation is with respect to p(x) and the Lagrange multiplier λ is chosen such that p(x) 
is consistent with the new information: dxCxdxp =∫ )()( . Instead of minimizing 
],[ mpS  one can equivalently minimize ]),[exp( 1 mpSc −  so the general variational 
problem becomes { } 0)()())(,( 2 =+∇ ∫∫ xCxdxpqqdxpf λδ . 
Let us now consider the case of two possibly dependent variables x and y, a prior 
knowledge in the form of a joint probability distribution m(x,y) and new information 
about y to the effect that y=y0. This is the same as constraining the marginal 
probability density of y to a delta distribution )()( 0yyyp −= δ , which can be 
achieved by imposing infinitely many simple constraints, one for each y value: 
)(),()( 0yyyxdxpydy −=∫∫ δλ . 
Under the circumstances, any reasonable updating rule must produce a posterior of the 
form )(/)(),()()|(),( 00 ymyyyxmyyyxmyxp −=−= δδ in compliance with 
probability theory’s product formula for conditional probabilities. Working out the 
variational equation for this case 
( ) )(ln24)(1221 22 yfqmqqq
q
qqq λββαββα =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ∇⋅∇−∇⋅∇∇⋅∇−∇+−∆−+  
it is easily seen that a solution with )(),(/),( yqyxmyxpq ==  is only possible, 
because of the last term in the brackets, for 0=β . Thus, requiring consistency with 
the probability theory’s product rule eliminates the derivative terms from the 
information measure and leaves us with the family of Renyi measures. It is worthwhile 
noticing that, as mentioned in the Introduction, the fact that it is possible at all to 
choose the parameters in compliance with probability theory’s product rule hinges 
essentially on the particular form of the functional required in Axiom 2 above. 
 
The Unique Updating Rule 
Consider the following situation: There is a common knowledge about two variables x 
and y which is codified into a joint prior m(x,y). A researcher A acquires a “g(x) 
meter” and uses it to measure the average value of g(x). He then duly uses M.E. to 
update his probability distribution from m(x,y) to pA(x,y). Another researcher, B, is 
 7
fortunate enough to borrow a “r(y) meter” from a friend and uses it to measure the 
average value of r(y). Then she similarly updates her prior to pB(x,y). Both researchers 
promptly publish the results of their measurements and thus become aware of each 
other’s measured averages. A uses B’s result to update his probability distribution 
pA(x,y) to pAB(x,y). Analogously, B uses A’s result and updates her probability 
distribution pB(x,y) to pBA(x,y). Then there is a slacker C who doesn’t care to 
experiment himself but carefully follows the literature and learns about A and B’s 
measurements. Using them simultaneously, he updates his prior m(x,y) to p(AB)(x,y). 
For the sake of consistency, we require that pAB(x,y)= pBA(x,y)= p(AB)(x,y). Turning to 
the variational equation resulting from the choice 0=β  above one observes that the 
updating amounts to multiplying the prior with a certain function of the constraint: 
)),((),(),( yxCFyxmyxp λα=  
This being the case it is obvious that the first part of our consistency requirement is 
already satisfied - A and B will end up with identical probability distributions: 
))(())((),(),( 21 yrFxgFyxmyxp λλ αα=  
As for the second part, it requires that the function )(zFα  has the property 
)()()( 2121 zFzFzzF ααα =+  which is only the case for α=0 when it is an exponential. 
Thus, our three basic axioms plus the two consistency conditions uniquely single out 
the Shannon-Jaynes relative entropy as the one to use in M.E. updating. One has to be 
aware though that if in the above example the researchers measured different functions 
of the same variable, it would be in general impossible to obtain posteriors consistent 
between the three of them. This is precisely the problem pointed out by Karbelkar and 
discussed by Giffin and Caticha in these proceedings. M.E. with the Shannon-Jaynes 
relative entropy is the closest one can get to a consistent inference scheme, but it, too, 
falls short of being exactly that. Giffin and Caticha advocate for using M.E. with 
uninformative priors and keeping track of all previously used constraints. When new 
information becomes available, the corresponding constraint are to be combined with 
the old ones and the whole set employed to obtain a posterior. This obviously 
invalidates the fundamental tenet of the updating rule that prior knowledge should be 
encoded into a prior probability distribution, and thus renders the prior distributions 
obsolete. 
DERIVATION OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE RULE 
In the preceding section we obtained a general information distance measure and used 
arguments derived from its intended use in a M.E. updating procedure to narrow down 
the choice of the β parameter value to β=0, thus excluding derivative terms. In fact, a 
much more general justification for this choice can be given by observing that the 
effective value of β depends on the scale on which the variable x is measured. Indeed, 
rescaling sxx →  implies ∇→∇ −1s  and thus, the ratio p/m being invariant, 
ββ 2−→ s . If one is to have a unique information distance measure, the only way to 
lift the ambiguity is to put β=0. This choice leaves us with a one-parameter family of 
“reasonable” information distance measures of the Renyi’s type. Now we set out to 
use this family for the purpose of working out a rule for assigning probabilities based 
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on incomplete information - the original Jaynes goal. The departure point is the 
following pair of axioms. 
The Axioms and the Constructive Rule 
         1. It is possible to meaningfully define a information content I[p] of a probability   
            distribution p(x) so that ),0[][ ∞∈pI  and ]),[(|][][| 2121 ppSLpIpI α=− where  
            L() is some convex linear combination over α; 
         2. The information content decreases upon coarse-graining: ][][ pIpI <σ  where   
             )(xpσ  is )(xp coarse-grained with a coarse-graining scale σ; 
Consider now the amount of the decrease ]),[(][][0 σασ ppSLpIpI =−< . Since the 
information content cannot go negative, the relation 
])[(][][][ pIFpIpIpI =− σ should hold with some function F(z) subject to the 
condition 0)( 0⎯→⎯ →zzzF . Inspecting both sides of the relation above it is easily seen 
that the probability density distribution for which the information content I[p] is 
minimal can be found among the probability density distributions for which 
][][ σpIpI − , or equivalently,  the information distance between the original and the 
coarse-grained probability density ],[ σα ppS , is minimal. Thus, the following rule for 
assigning probabilities suggests itself: When incomplete information is available, the 
probability distribution to be assigned is the one least sensitive to coarse-graining 
subject to all known constraints.  
The Variational Equation 
In working out the particularities of the constructive rule a great simplification results 
from utilizing the well-known fact that coarse-graining is statistically equivalent to 
adding noise. Indeed, the expression for the coarse-grained probability density 
)()()( zfzxpdzxp σσ += ∫  where )(zf  is a non-negative normalized coarse-
graining kernel and σ is the coarse-graining scale, can be interpreted as a 
marginalization ∫∫ == ),()()|()( zxdzpzfzxdzpxp σσσ  from a joint probability 
density ),( zxpσ describing a noisy system. In the limit 0=σ  there is no coarse-
graining and )()(),(0 zfxpzxp ==σ . We now consider the information distance 
between the original and the noisy probability distributions for infinitesimal coarse-
graining (σ<<1): ασσσσσα α ]),(/),()[,(ln],[ 0010 ∫ ==−= = zxpzxpzxdxdzpppS . 
Noticing that for isotropic coarse-graining kernel 0)( =∫ zfdzz i  and 
ijji zfzdzz χδ=∫ )(  where χ is a constant of the order of unity, we obtain by expanding 
in the powers of 2/1σ  
=+= ∫ −−= ασσα σα )](/)()[()(],[ 10 xpzxpxpzdxdzfppS  
)()]()[()1( 221 σασχ Oxpxdxp +∇+= ∫ −  
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Remarkably, irregardless of the value of α5, our probability assignment rule calls for a 
constrained minimization of the Fisher information 
min)()()]()[( 21 →+∇ ∫∫ − xCxpdxxpxpdx λ  
that would produce the p(x) least sensitive to coarse-graining subject to the known 
constraints. The corresponding Euler-Lagrange equation is easily obtained by setting 
)()( 2 xxp ψ=  and varying )(xψ without having to worry about the non-negativity of 
p(x), to obtain 
0)()()( =+∆− xxCx ψλψ  
DISCUSSION 
Our revision of the MaxEnt fundamental principles vindicated the Shannon-Jaynes 
relative entropy form as the information distance measure which produces the closest 
thing to a consistent rule for updating probabilities. This does not come as a big 
surprise, given the documented enormous success of its numerous applications. The 
analysis, however, also indicates the impossibility of deriving a probability assignment 
rule from the usual requirements for consistency and uniqueness. New ideas are 
needed, and the strategy proposed above is not unlike the way the energy is treated in 
Field Theory: although we cannot define a particular finite form of an information 
content measure, the mere assumption that such a measure exists allows us to 
constructively address the question of locating its minimum. The derived constructive 
rule involves minimizing a particular instance of the Fisher information subject to data 
constraints. This result is especially interesting in view of our original motivation of 
establishing a relation between physics laws and information theory. While the role 
Fisher information plays in many variational principles of physics has been known and 
extensively discussed for a long time [6,16,17], no plausible explanation of why 
exactly the Fisher information should be used has been offered. The result of the 
previous section seems to provide such an explanation. It also can give insight into 
why physical systems appear to follow this or that particular law. For example, 
comparing the constructive rule with the Schrodinger equation of Quantum Mechanics 
0)()]()[/2()( 2 =−+∆− xxUEmx ψψ h , it appears that the ground state probability 
distribution of quantum systems is obtained by merely constraining the average kinetic 
energy, or equivalently the temperature, of the system to have a certain value as if 
quantum systems were in contact with a universal thermostat. The difference from the 
conventional statistical physics is that instead of the average kinetic energy value, the 
value of the Lagrange multiplier is prescribed to be proportional to the system’s mass, 
namely 2/2 hm .  Studying the why’s and how’s of this and similar connections could 
greatly advance our understanding of the origin of the physics laws and the inner 
workings of the universe around us. 
                                                 
5 The statement hold even for linear combinations of different alphas, so the resulting rule is independent of whether one uses a 
Renyi distance, the symmetrized KL distance or even the Bernardo-Rueda divergence [15] 
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